Estate Planning

Does divorce revoke your will in the United States?

TheWILL.ai Team

The model provision a substantial minority of American states work from reaches far past the will, taking in beneficiary designations, joint tenancies and even the former spouse's relatives. A federal statute then lifts the largest accounts of all back out of its reach.

Does divorce revoke your will in the United States?
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A divorced parent updates their will, removing the former spouse exactly as their state's law says should already have happened automatically anyway, and considers the paperwork closed. Years later, at their death, their largest single asset turns out to be an employer-sponsored 401(k), and the beneficiary form on file with the plan administrator still names the former spouse, because nobody ever told the plan the divorce had happened. The will was never the document controlling that account. It never had been.

This article covers the United States generally, because succession law here is set state by state rather than by a single federal statute, and one specific federal law cuts across all of it in a way worth understanding on its own. What follows is general information rather than legal advice: which rule governs your will, and which rule governs each account you hold, are both facts a qualified professional needs to confirm for your own situation.

The model provision reaches a long way past the will

The Uniform Probate Code is a model statute, drafted for states to adopt in whole or in part rather than enacted federally, and the provision on this subject is its section 2-804. The heading it carries is the first sign that the usual summary is too narrow: revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by divorce. The text discussed below is Montana's enactment of it, at section 72-2-814 of the Montana Code Annotated, which was read directly for this article. Wording varies between adopting states, so it is offered as the pattern and not as the rule in any other state.

Divorce or annulment revokes any revocable disposition or appointment of property made to the former spouse "in a governing instrument", any provision conferring a power of appointment on them, and any nomination of them "to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian". A governing instrument is not confined to the will, and the section's own definition of a disposition of property expressly "includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument".

It reaches beyond documents altogether in one respect. Subsection (2)(b) provides that the divorce "severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and transforms the interests of the former spouses into tenancies in common". A jointly owned house that would have passed to the survivor automatically stops doing so, without anybody signing anything.

The exceptions are also wider than the usual one-line summary allows. The section gives way to the express terms of the governing instrument, and to a court order, and to "a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment". A properly drawn settlement agreement can therefore preserve something the statute would otherwise strip out. Montana's enactment adds a fourth exception of its own, for retirement systems established under Title 19 of its code, which is a reminder that an adopting state's version can carry carve-outs the model provision never had.

It removes the former spouse's family as well

This is the part that almost no general article mentions, and it is the one most likely to disinherit somebody nobody meant to disinherit. The revocation reaches not only the former spouse but "a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse", defined as a person related to the former spouse by blood, adoption or affinity who, after the divorce, is not related to the testator by blood, adoption or affinity.

A gift to a former stepchild, a legacy to a former mother-in-law, or the appointment of a former brother-in-law as trustee is revoked alongside everything left to the spouse, unless one of the exceptions above catches it. Someone who divorces, stays close to a stepchild, and assumes the will still provides for that child because the will still says so may be wrong in every state that follows this pattern.

What the statute pretends happened is a different fiction again

Every jurisdiction in this series invents a fiction to explain where the gift goes, and no two of them picked the same one. England and Wales and Northern Ireland treat the former spouse as having died on the date the marriage ended. Scotland treats them as having died before the testator. The Uniform Probate Code pattern splits its answer in two: provisions of the instrument are given effect "as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section", and only a revoked fiduciary nomination is treated as though those people "died immediately before the divorce or annulment".

The distinction is not merely stylistic. A disclaimer and a death are different events elsewhere in the same code, and which one the statute picks can change who receives the property instead. Working that out for a particular will is a job for the statute and a professional rather than for an article.

Separation counts in New York and not in California

Two Canadian provinces act on separation rather than on divorce, and readers who have met that rule reasonably ask whether it exists in the United States. It does in at least one state and it does not in others, which is the worst possible position for anyone assuming.

Montana's enactment closes the door in terms: "A decree of separation that does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section." California Probate Code section 6122 says the same thing in its own words, that "a decree of legal separation which does not terminate the status of spouses is not a dissolution for purposes of this section".

New York goes the other way, and it is the one state in this article where a couple who never divorce can still have the rule applied to them. Section 5-1.4 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law operates on "a divorce (including a judicial separation as defined in subparagraph (f)(2)) or annulment of a marriage", and subparagraph (f)(2) defines a judicial separation as a final decree or judgment of separation, valid under the law of New York, "which was rendered against the spouse". A New Yorker holding a separation decree of that kind may already have had their will and their designations edited, whether or not a divorce ever follows.

Federal law lifts the biggest accounts back out

The state provision above does reach beneficiary designations. Federal law then removes the largest single category of them from its grasp, and this is the point that catches the most people out.

Retirement accounts and life insurance provided through an employer are generally governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and they name their beneficiary on a form held by the plan administrator rather than in the will. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2001, a Washington statute revoking a beneficiary designation on divorce, so that the nonprobate asset passed "as if the former spouse failed to survive", was held to be pre-empted by ERISA as it applied to a Boeing pension plan and an employer life insurance policy. The state rule could not reach the plan. Note what the case shows about the state rule itself: Washington's statute was aimed squarely at beneficiary designations, and it was federal law rather than any limit in the state provision that stopped it working.

Eight years later the Court closed the other route people assume is open. In Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, the divorce decree itself had divested the former spouse of her interest in the plan, but the beneficiary form still named her. The Court held that the plan administrator had done its duty under ERISA by paying the benefits to her in conformity with the plan documents.

The reason the decree failed matters as much as the result, and it is the detail most summaries drop. The decree was not a qualified domestic relations order, the specific instrument ERISA recognises for assigning plan benefits, so the administrator was not required to honour it. Federal law does provide a route by which a court order can reach a plan. An ordinary divorce decree, however emphatically worded, is not that route, and neither is a will. Short of a qualified order obtained through the divorce itself, the only person who changes the beneficiary form is the account holder, by filing a new one with the plan administrator.

The statute has an answer to that, and it may not work

The drafters of the model provision anticipated exactly this problem. Montana's subsection (8)(b) provides that where the section "is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section", a former spouse or their relative who "not for value, received a payment, item of property, or other benefit to which that person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part of this section not preempted".

In other words: the plan pays the former spouse, and the state statute then tells the former spouse to hand it over. Whether that instruction survives contact with the same federal law that pre-empted the first attempt is not a question this article can settle, and the Supreme Court has not settled it either. In Kennedy the Court added, in a footnote, that it expressed no view "as to whether the Estate could have brought an action in state or federal court against Liv to obtain the benefits after they were distributed".

So the honest reading is the unglamorous one. There may be a remedy after the money has gone, it may require litigation, and it may fail. Changing the beneficiary form takes an afternoon.

Even outside ERISA, somebody still has to tell the payor

Where no federal question arises at all, the statute still does not undo a payment that has already been made. Under Montana's subsection (7) a payor is not liable for having paid the beneficiary named in the instrument, or for having relied on it in good faith, before it receives written notice of the divorce, and it "does not have a duty or obligation to inquire as to the continued marital relationship between the decedent and a beneficiary". That notice has to be sent by registered or certified mail with return receipt requested, or served in the way a summons is served, by somebody who knew to send it. Even then the payor "is only liable for actions taken 2 or more business days after the actual receipt" of it, so a payment already in motion is not caught by a letter arriving the day before.

This matters most for the accounts the federal rule does not cover. Whether a particular individual retirement account falls inside or outside ERISA is a question about that account rather than a general rule, and the answer can differ between two accounts held by the same person, so it is worth asking the provider rather than assuming from a 401(k).

Nineteen states is not most of them

The Uniform Probate Code is often described as the American rule, and on this provision that description does more harm than good. The Legal Information Institute's list of states that have enacted the Code in whole or in part runs to nineteen, from Idaho in 1971 to Massachusetts in 2009. That is a substantial minority rather than a majority, and the states outside it include the largest ones.

New York and California are both outside it and both legislate for themselves. New York's section 5-1.4 is close to the model in reach, covering a disposition "by will, by security registration in beneficiary form (TOD), by beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy or (to the extent permitted by law) in a pension or retirement benefits plan, or by revocable trust, including a bank account in trust form", together with powers of appointment and nominations to any fiduciary capacity.

California takes the same ground by a different route, and this is where a reader who stops at the wills section will go wrong. Section 6122 of the Probate Code is indeed about the will alone: it revokes a disposition made by the will to the former spouse, a provision conferring a power of appointment on them, and a provision nominating them "as executor, trustee, conservator, or guardian", and the property "passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the testator". It revives what it revoked if the couple remarry each other. But the sentence that appears to close the topic does not, because it opens with an exception: "Except as provided in Section 6122.1, no change of circumstances other than as described in this section revokes a will."

Two further California sections do the work section 6122 leaves alone. Section 6122.1 applies the same revocation where a registered domestic partnership is terminated rather than a marriage dissolved, for wills executed on or after 1 January 2002, and revives the gift if the testator later establishes another domestic partnership with the same person. Section 5040 then reaches the beneficiary designations: a nonprobate transfer to a former spouse "fails if, at the time of the transferor's death, the former spouse is not the transferor's surviving spouse", and the instrument "shall be treated as it would if the former spouse failed to survive the transferor". Its own definition covers a provision in an instrument operating on death, other than a will, and it applies to a terminated registered domestic partnership as well as to a dissolved marriage. Three exceptions save the transfer: that it was not revocable by the transferor at death, clear and convincing evidence that the transferor intended to preserve it, or a court order in effect at death that the transfer be maintained.

So the tidy contrast between a broad New York and a narrow California is not there. Read at the level of the whole code rather than one famous section, both states reach the designations, and the forty-seven this article has not read may reach them from sections nobody would think to look up either.

The forms that do not update themselves

  • Which state's law governs your will, and separately which state's law governs each account, particularly after a move
  • Every beneficiary designation on a retirement account, pension or life insurance policy, checked one at a time against the form the provider actually holds
  • Whether any property held jointly with a former spouse has been dealt with, given that some states sever the survivorship right and others do not
  • Whether anyone on the former spouse's side of the family is named in your will, since a statute of this pattern may have removed them along with the spouse
  • Whether your will names a substitute executor or trustee, given the current appointee may no longer be able to serve

If a review is overdue, our individual wills service can help you start one, and our guide on whether you need a solicitor to write a will in the United States covers the wider process, including the accounts a will was never going to control in the first place.

The will is only ever part of the picture here. The forms sitting behind it, at a bank, an insurer or an employer's plan administrator, do not know a divorce happened until somebody tells them, and no state's revocation statute can do that telling on the account holder's behalf.

Sources

A note on the scope of this article. Three states' law was read directly against its own text, Montana's at section 72-2-814 and New York's at section 5-1.4 and California's at sections 6122, 6122.1 and 5040, and the two Supreme Court decisions were read in the Legal Information Institute's reports of them. The Uniform Probate Code's own published text was not read, so section 2-804 is described here only through Montana's enactment of it. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act's own text was not read either, and this article therefore does not state which accounts ERISA governs, nor what makes a domestic relations order a qualified one, beyond what Egelhoff and Kennedy decided about the plans in front of the Court. Whether the clawback obligation described above survives contact with the federal law that pre-empted the underlying revocation is unsettled, and the footnote in Kennedy is as far as the authorities go. The remaining forty-seven states, the District of Columbia and the territories are not stated here at all.

Written by

TheWILL.ai Team

The editorial team at TheWILL.ai, dedicated to making estate planning accessible and modern.

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